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THE POLITICS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: A RISKY
BET FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN BRAZIL
JULIO BORGES*
ABSTRACT
Seeking to disseminate cost-benefit analysis as part of a global
agenda of reforms on regulatory policy, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) has advocated this economic tool
to all its member countries. A key partner of that international organiza-
tion since 2007, Brazil officially sought in 2017 to be a permanent OECD
member, which means accepting orientation from that organization on
policy reforms, namely regulatory policy. This Article disagrees with
OECD’s recommendation because traditional cost-benefit analysis has
been technically flawed and politically biased towards a deregulatory
agenda. The purpose of this Article, therefore, is to analyze the potential
impacts of introducing cost-benefit analysis for environmental law and
policy in Brazil. To achieve this goal, understanding the particular back-
ground and features of environmental law and policy in Brazil becomes
essential. In this sense, this Article argues that cost-benefit analysis cre-
ates a particular risk to environmental law and policy in Brazil due to at
least three factors: (a) it would reinforce the already strong presidential
dominance over the regulatory agenda on environmental protection, under-
mining environmental agencies’ authority and scientific-based decisions;
(b) it would imperil any possibility of improvement of the current levels
of transparency, participation, and accountability on the decision-making
processes for environmental laws and regulations; (c) it conceals a regu-
latory policy against new and existing laws and regulations on environ-
mental protection.
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INTRODUCTION
At first glance, cost-benefit analysis might seem a helpful tool for
rationalizing decision-making processes for laws and regulations. After
all, numbers are straightforward and neutral. But as one moves closer
to understanding why cost-benefit analysis was created and how it has
traditionally been applied in the United States, one might realize that
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cost-benefit analysis has been a methodologically flawed and politically
biased tool. In a broad sense, cost-benefit analysis has been an instru-
ment for implementing a business-friendly agenda based on laissez-faire
ideas fairly unsympathetic to any major role for government in society.1
The traditional methodologies used for cost-benefit analysis have
been particularly controversial. As Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman
point out in their helpful book on cost-benefit analysis,2 methods for giving
a monetary value to either a human life, some endangered plant or animal,
or a given ecosystem present serious flaws and ethical assumptions that
undermine any credibility for that economic exercise.3
Although all these problems have been associated to traditional
cost-benefit analysis, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (“OECD”)—a powerful international think-tank that gathers
a select group of rich countries to advocate for global policies based on
free-market ideas—has been a major global player for spreading this
economic tool throughout several developed and emerging economies,
Brazil included.4
Rational approaches to regulatory decisions are a legitimate goal
for any society, and cost-benefit analysis advocates have a point here. It
is fair to recognize that the lawmaking process—in any democracy—
appears to be the result of crude ideological disputes and seemingly messy
lobbying from different social actors.5 However, this is how democracy
actually works. For tackling the complex social, economic, and environ-
mental challenges to be faced in the twenty-first century, governments
should therefore improve their ability to create more transparent and
accountable decision-making processes for regulatory decisions. The tra-
ditional cost-benefit analysis, however, points in the opposite direction
by creating obscure calculation methods and unaccountable institutional
channels throughout the decision-making process.
This Article argues that traditional cost-benefit analysis poses a
particular risk to environmental law and policy in Brazil due to at least
three factors: (a) it would reinforce the already strong presidential domi-
nance over the regulatory agenda on environmental protection, under-
mining the authority of environmental agencies; (b) it would imperil any
1 THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE LAISSEZ FAIRE
REVIVAL 69 (2013).
2 FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERY-
THING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004).
3 Id. at 11.
4 See generally OECD, REGULATORY POLICY OUTLOOK 2015 (2015).
5 See, e.g., MCGARITY, supra note 1, at 70.
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possibility of improvement of the current levels of transparency and
accountability in the decision-making processes for environmental laws
and regulations; and (c) it conceals a regulatory policy against new and
existing laws and regulations on environmental protection.
To tackle all those factors, this Article is divided into two parts.
The first Part provides an analysis of how politics has shaped traditional
cost-benefit analysis in the United States and the role of the OECD in dis-
seminating that economic tool throughout market-based economies, Brazil
included. The second Part explores the history and background of envi-
ronmental law and policy in Brazil to feature some major characteristics
of that field and point out singular risks posed by cost-benefit analysis.
I. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: ORIGINS, METHODOLOGY, AND A
CRITIQUE
When one looks at the trajectory of cost-benefit analysis in the
United States, the United Kingdom, parts of Europe, and Australia, it rises
like a seemingly unstoppable tide.6 A neutral and scientific tool that im-
poses economic rationality for risk analyses over complex regulations is
a powerful rhetoric.7 As government decisions in democratic countries
usually involve an overwhelming set of ongoing conflicts and deals among
different social groups, rational decision-making processes become a leg-
itimate goal for those concerned with regulatory policy.8 But when seen
more closely, traditional cost-benefit analysis reveals a series of methodo-
logic flaws and politically biased assumptions that overshadow any value
from its use.
In this Part, I review the history and main features of cost-benefit
analysis to eventually gather some of the most influential critiques of it.
By tracking its origins and development in the United States, it will
clarify the original and ongoing purpose and use of cost-benefit analysis
as a strategic weapon established to reduce the role of government in the
economy. Further, analyzing the role of the OECD in globally spreading
free-market policies in general, and cost-benefit analysis in particular,
will be helpful to understand how this economic tool has been surround-
ing Brazil. But first of all, it is necessary to understand the basics of cost-
benefit analysis and the main arguments against it.
6 See OECD, supra note 4, at 2.
7 See generally MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS (2006); CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION (2018).
8 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at xviii.
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A. Basic Understanding and Critique
The traditional cost-benefit analysis involves three assumptions:
(a) government projects and policies entail costs and benefits; (b) costs
and benefits can be quantified and compared; and (c) as resources in so-
ciety are limited and choices must be made to achieve results that im-
prove the aggregate welfare and maximize net benefits, public policy or
project benefits should overcome or justify their costs.9
A project to build a highway, for example, imposes costs and bene-
fits to society. Benefits could be identified as improved infrastructure for
transportation, increased export rates for national industries (such as
agriculture, livestock, or mining), and reduced traffic for the local popula-
tion. The most evident costs are the economic resources needed to finance
the project, but there are also unquantifiable externalities such as the
impacts on the environment (for example, air and water pollution).
For a rule-making proposal, costs and benefits accrue as well. A
regulation to curb air pollution from vehicles, for instance, entails costs
and benefits. Costs come, for example, from an imposed technology for
reducing car pollution or a mandatory improvement on fuel efficiency.
The most evident benefits from cleaner air are a reduction of human
mortality and lung-related disease rates, mitigation of acid rain, and a
moderated impact on the climate.10
In both situations (a project or a policy), quantification of costs or
benefits might be a hard task when some “commodities” (human lives or
ecosystems, for example) are simply not tradeable in markets. In these
situations, advocates for cost-benefit analysis seek to put a price on human
life or the environment by mimicking real markets in order to achieve
monetary values for such untradeable “commodities.”11
1. Determining the Price
For policy and rule-making decisions, it is widely accepted that it
is usually easier to quantify costs than benefits, though overestimation
9 For this purpose, economists see cost-benefit analysis as a tool for achieving Kaldhor-
Hicks efficiency, which means an overall increase in social welfare where winners could
compensate the losers. See Edward P. Stringham, Kaldhor-Hicks Efficiency and the
Problem of Central Planning, 4 Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 41, 44 (2001).
10 Progress Cleaning the Air and Improving People’s Health, EPA, https://www.epa.gov
/clean-air-act-overview/progress-cleaning-air-and-improving-peoples-health [https://perma
.cc/DZD4-B9B5] (last updated Aug. 14, 2019).
11 See GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 225 (2015).
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of costs has been common.12 The price of an existing technology required
by a new regulation on water pollution, for instance, usually is determined
in private markets.13 But on the side of benefits (a human life or an en-
dangered species, for example), determining their price is an impossible
task that cost-benefit practitioners assume as if it were possible.14
To determine the price of policy benefits such as a human life or
the environment, “willingness to pay” has been the criterion used in tra-
ditional cost-benefit analysis in the United States.15 In real markets,
willingness to pay and willingness to accept are the most important
economic concepts to identify the price of a given product.16 But as hu-
man life and the environment are not products found in markets, cost-
benefit analysis authorities use two alternative methods to determine
the willingness to pay for those “commodities”: (a) “contingent valuation”
and (b) risk-related behaviors.17 While the latter focuses, for instance, on
how much workers accept for risky jobs or consumers pay for health
insurance, the former is based on simple and direct surveys with people,
asking them how much they value human lives or endangered species,
for example.18
Apart from moral arguments, methods to identify the willingness
to pay for human lives, wildlife species, or ecosystems, make no sense at
all. First, the willingness to pay method completely ignores the differ-
ences between the choices made by a human being as a citizen and a
consumer.19 Further, the willingness of a consumer to pay for a market
product (a car, for example) and the vague and illusory value that this
consumer might have for a human life are totally different.20
Still, values obtained by analysis of different wages for risky and
non-risky jobs are flawed because the reality of workers in those jobs
might not be superior in monetary terms.21 Either workers might not
understand the risks involved in their jobs or they simply cannot choose
12 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 38.
13 Despite this fact, some regulations in the United States seek to force new technology.
In this case, determining the price of this new technology might be a hard task.
14 MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
92 (2008).
15 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 94–98.
16 MANKIW, supra note 11, at 135–36, 140.
17 See generally ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2.
18 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 164.
19 SAGOFF, supra note 14, at 31.
20 See id.
21 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 75–76.
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another job because they lack the skills.22 Similar reasoning can be made
regarding people buying health insurance.
Besides the “willingness to pay” method, cost-benefit analysis au-
thorities use a discount rate to achieve the present value of human lives
saved or an improved environment in the future.23 In other words, as
benefits from environmental regulations are usually enjoyed only in the
future (environmental policies for tackling climate change, for example),
the present value of those benefits should be discounted according to
traditional cost-benefit analysis.
The main problems related to discount rates deal with ethical
judgements on the value of future lives and its validity as a rational
method to determine the present value of benefits to be created in a
distant future.24 As discount rates are largely used in private markets to
determine the current value of a future quantity of money, their use for
pricing human lives to be saved or ecosystems to be protected in the fu-
ture entails a reduction of the intrinsic value of those lives and ecosys-
tems.25 Future generations, for example, would be assigned a lower value
than the present ones (on existential terms) so their monetary price could
not justify a given regulation to prevent future harms.26 This assumption,
which is questionable on moral terms, directly affects the methodology
for using discount rates for public policies based on cost-benefit analysis.
Depending on the chosen discount rate (0.5 percent, 3 percent, or
12 percent, for example), the present value of future generations (in
centuries) might be almost nothing. Disputes within the federal govern-
ment in the United States that place the value of a human life between
$3.7 and $6.1 million illustrate how poor that mechanism is.27 Further,
as countries with emerging economies such as Brazil might not have the
resources to develop sophisticated calculations and methodologies to
determine their own discount rates, they might simply choose random and
arbitrary rates to justify choices based on economic policy priorities.28
22 Id. at 77.
23 Discount rate is a method used in regular markets (particularly financial markets) for
determining the present value of a future amount of money. For example, $100 today
does not have the same value of $100 in one year. At a 3 percent discount rate, $100
today means $103 in one year.
24 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 186.
25 Id. at 187.
26 Id. at 190–91.
27 Id. at 200.
28 As the United States has adopted a discount rate between 3 percent and 7 percent for
cost-benefit analysis, Mexico has adopted a discount rate of 12 percent for cost-benefit
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Furthermore, discounting future benefits simply ignores the irre-
versible risks of future environmental catastrophes. As lives and nature
in the future are valued less for cost-benefit analysis, foreseeable extreme
events and their impact on those future generations remain unconsid-
ered. In other words, traditional cost-benefit analysis does not take into
consideration a crisis perspective.29
Together, uninformed surveys on willingness to pay for non-
tradeable values and highly speculative discount rates for future benefits
compose the basic methodologic portfolio for traditional cost-benefit
analysis. The indeterminacy and obscurity of those criteria to make up a
price for a human life or the environment only reinforce how cost-benefit
analysis is subject to political motivation and biased manipulation.
Finally, as pricing everything is impossible, cost-benefit advocates
have created qualitative elements (distributive aspects and impacts on
rights, for example) to be considered when officials should decide on a
given regulation.30 The problem is that once costs and benefits are quan-
tified in monetary terms, and a cost-benefit analysis is assumed as a
regulatory tool for deciding the government’s actions and policies, those
qualitative aspects are not considered or, at most, do not meaningfully
influence the final decision.31 After all, numbers present a straightfor-
ward picture that is impossible to compare or balance with complex
welfare, no quantitative elements such as distributive impacts or impacts
on rights from rules.
2. Transparency and Accountability
With regard to decision-making processes for regulatory decisions,
clear communication and an open process are essential for guaranteeing
the transparency and accountability of those decisions. Instead, cost-benefit
analysis creates obstacles to transparency and accountability.
First, as traditional cost-benefit analysis applies a highly techni-
cal language for decision makers and requires the creation of an over-
sight office, significant challenges are imposed on agencies and public
interest groups.
analysis on its infrastructure projects. See MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE & RICHARD L. REVESZ,
THE GLOBALIZATION OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 169 (2013).
29 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 186.
30 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six
Questions (and Almost as Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 195 (2014).
31 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in Its Place: Rethinking Regu-
latory Review, U. MIAMI L. REV. 335, 335–36 (2010).
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People not trained in economics usually have difficulty in under-
standing or discussing economic terms.32 In the case of cost-benefit
analysis and its specialized (or “impenetrable”)33 economic vocabulary,
even a basic understanding of its practice requires considerable training
in economics.34 Lawyers and scientists not familiar with economic terms,
for example, may find no room to participate in those technical discussions.
As transparency and accountability have high value for democra-
cies and rights protection, clear communication is an essential tool to
improve both participation and social control over regulatory activity.
The justification for regulatory decisions should be accessible to all af-
fected industries, public interest groups, and citizens. As cost-benefit
analysis limits policy discussions to an economic vocabulary, it creates
more hurdles for open and accessible participation in the public arena.35
But technical language is not the only factor that can reduce
transparency and accountability. The creation of an oversight office to
supervise agencies might affect openness and create obscure institutional
channels for influencing the final decision, undermining environmental
agencies’ authority.36
In the United States, since the introduction of cost-benefit analysis
in 1981 and the creation of an oversight office located within the Presi-
dent’s office (the Office on Information and Regulatory Affairs—“OIRA”),
the transparency and accountability patterns provided by the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (“APA”) have been undermined.37 Undisclosed
discussions among agencies, OIRA, other executive branch authorities, and
affected industries have influenced the decision-making processes of federal
agencies. These obscure channels have been created in connection with
cost-benefit analysis, though they are not provided for by the APA.38
This American model of creating oversight offices to supervise
agencies on cost-benefit analysis has inspired the OECD’s agenda on
32 See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1577–78 (2002).
33 Wendy E. Wagner, The CAIR Ria: Advocacy Dressed Up as Policy Analysis, in RE-
FORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 66 (Winston Harrington et al. eds., 2009).
34 Id.
35 See SEBASTIAN DAMART & BERNARD ROY, U. PARIS-DAUPHINE , LIMITATIONS OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS TO SUPPORT PUBLIC DEBATE: THE CASE OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
DECISION-MAKING IN FRANCE 3, 11 (2006).
36 See Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship Be-
tween the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 326 (2014).
37 See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law,
92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1138–39 (2014).
38 Heinzerling, supra note 36, at 326.
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regulatory policy. According to the OECD’s recommendations on regula-
tory policy, all its member countries should provide for the creation of
oversight bodies to supervise agencies’ regulations.39 An office in the central
government (such as the Office of the President or the Prime Minister)
would be highly recommended according to the OECD’s guidance.40
In sum, rather than an open and accessible process of discussion
on regulatory decisions between agencies and society, the American
experience with traditional cost-benefit analysis and its oversight office
demonstrates how that model has expanded the possibilities for behind-
closed-door lobbying on government affairs, reducing transparency and
accountability for regulatory decisions.
B. Tracking Cost-Benefit Analysis: Beyond the American Experience
To understand how cost-benefit analysis has become an influen-
tial regulatory tool in some advanced economies and how its advocates
aim to introduce it in emerging economies (such as Brazil), it is impor-
tant to track its original motivations and historical pathway. In this sense,
it is necessary to identify the political origins of cost-benefit analysis and
explore the dynamic of international cooperation networks that advocate
for widespread use of this tool throughout the world.
1. Political Origins and Development
The systematic and ongoing use of cost-benefit analysis became
widespread in the United States after President Reagan’s election in
1980. Under a conservative platform for economic policy, which assumed
that the government and the regulations it promulgated negatively af-
fected the economy, President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12291,
which determined: (a) a mandatory use of cost-benefit analysis for all
major federal regulations (meaning regulations that impacted the econ-
omy by $100 million or more); (b) the creation of OIRA within the Office
of Management and Budget (“OMB”), located in the White House under
direct presidential supervision, to oversee all major proposed regulations
from federal agencies through cost-benefit analysis.41 During President
Reagan’s tenure, the practice of cost-benefit analysis by agencies (under
OIRA oversight) was intense and the number of regulations issued by
39 OECD, supra note 4, at 94.
40 Id.
41 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
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federal agencies decreased dramatically.42 Rules on environmental pro-
tection were particularly affected.43 This deregulatory trend was main-
tained by President George H. W. Bush.44
After the electoral victory of President Bill Clinton in 1995, there
was an expectation that cost-benefit analysis would be set aside.45 How-
ever, as President Bill Clinton sought to increase his influence over the
federal agencies’ regulatory agenda, a new executive order (Executive
Order No. 12866) was enacted, keeping cost-benefit analysis as a major
regulatory tool.46 The difference here is that, according to the new execu-
tive order, other welfare aspects (such as redistributive issues and indi-
vidual rights) were to be considered in the decision-making processes for
cost-benefit analysis.47 Further, benefits should only justify (not exceed,
as provided by the original executive order signed by Reagan) the costs
of the proposed regulation.48
When President George W. Bush entered office in 2001, cost-benefit
analysis returned to its original purpose. A bold deregulatory policy—
under President Bush and his OIRA chief John Graham, an enthusiastic
scholar of cost-benefit analysis—used cost-benefit analysis as its major
scientific justification.49 Environmental regulation was again particularly
affected as no meaningful policy on climate change was provided and the
relationship between OIRA and environmental organizations was partic-
ularly antagonistic.50
President Obama’s election in 2008 represented a new opportunity
to review the adoption of cost-benefit analysis as an influential regulatory
tool. But, as it had occurred under Clinton’s administration, cost-benefit
analysis survived as a central tool for regulatory policy within the federal
government. A new executive order was enacted in 2011 (Executive Order
No. 13,563), by which other welfare considerations were incorporated
into the cost-benefit analysis.51
42 MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE & RICHARD L. REVESZ, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 24–29 (2008).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 29–30.
45 Id. at 31.
46 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).
47 Id.
48 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed.
Reg. 13,193 (1981).
49 John D. Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush
Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 101–02 (2006).
50 LIVERMORE & REVESZ, supra note 42, at 24–29.
51 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (2011).
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Finally, at the time of this Article’s writing, President Donald
Trump’s first actions have confirmed that cost-benefit analysis will again
serve the purpose of justifying a deregulatory agenda.52
2. Arriving in Brazil Through Paris: The Influence of the OECD
Brazil has no tradition of using cost-benefit analysis as a tool for
regulatory policy.53 But an evolving approximation of that country with
the OECD, a highly reputed international organization based on multi-
lateral cooperation and headquartered in Paris, has been challenging that
framework. That intergovernmental think-tank has openly advocated for
cost-benefit analysis worldwide. The issue here is how this organization
might be able to influence and shape regulatory policy in Brazil.
3. OECD: History
As World War II ended and the Marshall Plan was implemented
throughout Europe, European countries created the Organization for Euro-
pean Economic Cooperation (“OEEC”).54 The OEEC’s early goals were
related to managing the Marshall Plan and promoting free-market policies
among national economies within Europe.55
After the end of the Marshall Plan in 1952 and the establishment
of the European Economic Communities in 1957, the OEEC became the
OECD.56 Fostering free-market policies has become the OECD’s foremost
52 President Trump issued a new executive order on January 30, 2017 (numbered 13,771)
labeled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,” reinforcing concerns on
overly burdensome costs created by regulations on industry. Further, the Trump Admin-
istration has proposed repealing the Clean Power Plan based on cost-benefit analysis. For
an analysis of that justification and the role played by cost-benefit analysis, see Jack
Lienke & Richard Revesz, The E.P.A.’s Smoke and Mirrors on Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/opinion/environmental-protection-obama-pruitt
.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/A9WC-KEV8].
53 ELIANE P. DE SOUSA ET AL., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS IN BRAZIL: THEORETICAL
APPROACH AND APPLICATIONS IN POLICIES FOR AGRICULTURE DEFENSE 3 (2015).
54 Marshall Plan, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Marshall
-Plan [https://perma.cc/K6JN-77ET] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
55 James Salzman, Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 769,
774 (2000).
56 Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/general
/organisationforeuropeaneconomicco-operation.htm [https://perma.cc/SLN5-AKQL] (last
visited Dec. 3, 2019).
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agenda.57 During the Cold War, this compromise with free-market ideas
had an important role against planning economic ideas advocated by
communist nations.58
Known as a “rich man’s club,”59 the OECD was originally estab-
lished by twenty wealthy industrialized countries including the United
States, Canada, Western European members, and Australia. Nowadays,
the OECD has thirty-six permanent members.60 The only requirement for
a country entering this “club” is having a market-based economy (mean-
ing a non-communist or non-socialist nation).61
Composed mostly of economists on its payroll,62 the OECD’s re-
search covers virtually all fields of interest to the business community,
including trade, environment, agriculture, technology, taxation, education,
foreign assistance, and employment.63 Assessing the economic impacts of
all those policies is a major feature of all that research.64 The regular pro-
ceedings of the OECD often occur in closed meetings65 among members
for sharing experiences and deciding recommendations, making detailed
studies of economic performance, and producing technical reports on regu-
latory quality.66 Documents produced by the OECD are made public only
after approval by all its members; a process known as “derestriction.”67
Today, the OECD represents a low-profile but important part of
the mainstream for international organizations responsible for advocat-
ing free market policies throughout the world, including other Bretton
57 OECD, THE OECD: ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(2008), https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/34011915.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JN7-JJYN].
58 Salzman, supra note 55, at 775.
59 Id. at 776.
60 See List of OECD Member Countries—Ratification of the Convention on the OECD,
OECD, https://www.oecd.org/about/document/list-oecd-member-countries.htm [https://
perma.cc/D6BS-LZTQ] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
61 Salzman, supra note 55, at 776.
62 Id. at 777.
63 See id. at 774.
64 Id. at 777.
65 Id. at 776–77 (“While it is not voiced openly, it is important to understand that many
OECD country delegates think of the closed-door meetings of the OECD as a welcome
alternative forum to what is often viewed as the developing country dominated and
politicized United Nations system.”).
66 Id. at 778 (“No OECD document may be released publicly without approval by all the
Member countries, a process known as ‘derestriction.’ Internal documents are not publicly
available and can therefore be quite explicit with pointed recommendations and detailed
case studies.”).
67 Salzman, supra note 55, at 778.
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Woods institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the World
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”).68
Among the most ambitious policy agendas advocated by the OECD,
regulatory policy has been at the forefront. Alongside tax and monetary
policies, the OECD reckons regulation of markets the most important policy
for countries to attract foreign investors and improve their economies.69
For these purposes, countries must reform their regulatory frameworks
to avoid being overly burdensome on businesses. The central regulatory
tool for avoiding those undue regulations is a mechanism that has long
been known and used in the United States: cost-benefit analysis.
Although Brazil is not an OECD member yet, it has been consid-
ered a “Key Partner” since 2007.70 Being a “Key Partner” means that the
OECD has potential interest in having a country as a member.71 Also, as
a partner, Brazil has participated in several OECD meetings and com-
mittees, sharing experiences and being assessed in some policy fields such
as economic, regulatory, and environmental policies.72 But the interest
does not only flow in one direction. Eager to attract foreign investments
and overcome a huge economic crisis initiated in 2015,73 Brazil officially
sought its integration into the OECD as a permanent member in 2017,74
which means accepting and officially working together on policies advo-
cated by the OECD.
68 See WTO, IMF, World Bank and OECD Heads Call for New Focus on Trade as a Driver
of Growth, WTO (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/dgra_10
oct18_e.htm [https://perma.cc/8XWZ-M78C].
69 OECD, supra note 4, at 44 (“In its broader definition, regulatory reform has the poten-
tial to raise GDP per capita of OECD economies by up to 25% through the implementation
of structural reforms . . . .”).
70 Active with Brazil, OECD (May 2015), http://www.oecd.org/brazil/Brazil%20brochure
WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE78-CWZU].
71 Key Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/global-relations/keypartners/ [https://perma
.cc/Q5AQ-EFEV] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
72 See, e.g., OECD Environmental Performance Review: Brazil 2015, OECD (Nov. 4, 2015),
https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/oecd-environmental-performance-reviews-bra
zil-2015_9789264240094-en#page1 [https://perma.cc/2EDB-EN2H].
73 Brazil has been in its worst economic crisis ever. Brazil’s economy shrank 3.8 percent
in 2015 and 3.6 percent in 2016. Unemployment hit 12.6 percent in 2017. For a snapshot
of the Brazilian economic crisis, see Silvio Cascione, Brazil Worst Ever Recession Unex-
pectedly Deepens in Late 2016, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article
/us-brazil-economy-gdp/brazils-worst-ever-recession-unexpectedly-deepens-in-late-2016
-idUSKBN16E1EL [https://perma.cc/F7W4-TREN].
74 A mutually beneficial relationship, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/latin-america/countries
/brazil/ [https://perma.cc/4QPT-VG7J] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
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4. The OECD and Cost-Benefit Analysis
Called Regulatory Impact Analysis (“RIA”) by the OECD,75 cost-
benefit analysis has been a major tool of the OECD for proposing laissez-
faire reforms of regulatory policies worldwide. An official checklist
recommended by the OECD to national authorities explicitly features the
idea that regulations should be based on economic consideration:
A clear assessment of total costs and benefits—including
those to businesses, private citizens, and administrations—
likely to be realised in practice is crucial information for
decision-makers. These estimates are needed to make
judgements about the reasonableness of a regulation and
its practicality for those who will comply; to design an
approach with the lowest costs and highest benefits; and
to assess its effectiveness in solving the problem. Their
objective is to enable policy and political officials to ask the
right questions and reach confident judgments that a regu-
lation is, on net, beneficial. . . . In all cases . . . a reasonable
judgment should be made that the costs of government
action are justified by its benefits before action is taken.76
As a strategy for convincing other countries of how accurate cost-
benefit analysis would be, the OECD has opted to introduce that economic
tool after several previous steps including formal assessments (such as
the compatibility of the proposed rule with national laws and interna-
tional treaties) and distributive concerns,77 which essentially might not
alter the final result when traditional cost-benefit analysis is required.78
75 According to OECD, RIA would be a more comprehensive methodology for assessing
regulations. Beyond economic analysis, RIA would consider substitute risks (called “risk-
risk”), alternative regulatory strategies (to avoid traditional command-and-control rules),
and fairness issues such as distributive impact from regulations. The problem with this
definition is that traditional cost-benefit analysis as applied in the United States already
covers all those risk analyses. Avoiding a major reference to cost-benefit analysis seems
to be just part of a broader OECD strategy for convincing countries about an essentially
inaccurate difference between RIA and CBA. For an overview of OECD’s recommenda-
tions on regulatory policy, see OECD, RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL ON REGULATORY
POLICY AND GOVERNANCE 4 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/49990817
.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8VV-FD3U].
76 Legal Instruments, OECD, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/128/body-text
.en.html [https://perma.cc/KW3A-USZN] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019) (emphasis added).
77 OECD, supra note 4, at 103.
78 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 37.
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Further, the OECD’s version of cost-benefit analysis is even more
ambitious than the traditional one applied in the United States. A
“whole-of-government” approach advocated by the OECD means that not
only regulations enacted by agencies should pass that economic test, but
also laws approved by Congress and confirmed by the President should be
assessed under a cost-benefit analysis,79 sort of an international version
of the “Contract with America.”80 And this approach would be used for all
future and existing laws and regulations.81
This is the version of cost-benefit analysis that Brazil would be
subject as an OECD permanent member.
5. Brazil and Cost-Benefit Analysis
Even before Brazil became an OECD “Key Partner” in 2007, re-
forms of regulatory policies have been part of the institutional discourse
of different administrations. At least since 1990 and the first reforms to
liberalize the national economy under the guidance of the IMF, the World
Bank, and the principles of the Washington Consensus,82 attracting foreign
investments and promoting economic development have been used to
argue for reforms of regulatory policies.83
In the wake of the first national policies under the Washington
Consensus and the OECD’s recommendations on regulatory policy, in 2002
cost-benefit analysis was, for the first time, required by the Brazilian
government. An executive order signed by President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso expressly provided that any regulation proposed within the
executive branch would require a cost-benefit analysis.84 This executive
order imposed a long list of impact analyses quite similar to those pro-
posed by the OECD since 1995. Another executive order was issued in
79 OECD, supra note 75, at 6–7.
80 DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 7 (1999).
81 Id.
82 The Washington Consensus is a set of ten highly conservative economic policy pre-
scriptions to Latin American countries, prescribed by multilateral organizations such as
the World Bank and IMF, and by the U.S. Department of Treasury. One of those prescrip-
tions suggests a radical deregulatory policy of internal markets to those countries. See
generally JOHN WILLIAMSON, LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED
90–120 (1990).
83 See Lei No. 8.031, de 12 de Abril de 1990, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.4.1990
(Braz.) (The first national policy under the Washington Consensus was adopted in 1990).
84 See Decreto No. 4.176, de 28 de Março de 2002, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
1.4.2002 (Braz.).
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2017.85 Notwithstanding, the practical effects of those executive orders
have remained quite limited since methodologies have not been developed
to assess the impacts of regulations. Further, there have not been enough
trained regulators to carry out cost-benefit analysis on a large scale within
the federal government (although official guidelines have been released
to provide guidance to agency officials).86 Although the executive order
remains in place until now, its practical effects have been quite limited
since methodologies have not been developed to assess the impacts of reg-
ulations.87 Further, there have not been enough trained regulators to carry
out cost-benefit analysis on a large scale within the federal government.
In 2008, the OECD reinforced its strategy for regulatory reforms
in Brazil. For the first time, a specific and broad-based study of regulations
regarding some economic sectors has resulted in a report on the state of
regulatory reforms in Brazil.88 Among many different recommendations
provided by this study, the OECD strongly supported the development
of cost-benefit analysis for the Brazilian government.89
After turbulent political events put a new administration in power
in 2016,90 Brazil officially applied to become a permanent member of the
OECD in 2017.91 In theory, this means that the country accepts and is will-
ing to officially work to carry out reforms advocated by that international
85 Decreto No. 9.191, de 1 de Novembro de 2017, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
3.11.2017 (Braz.).
86 See generally INTERMINISTERIAL GOVERNANCE COMM’N, GENERAL GUIDELINES AND GUID-






87 Although the executive order requires cost-benefit analysis for proposing new regula-
tions, for example, there are no procedures, standards, nor methods for assessing costs
and benefits from those regulations. Key issues for cost-benefit analysis, such as putting
a price on human lives, cancer rates, the environment, or discounting rates for future
benefits, have not been developed yet.
88 See generally OECD, OECD REVIEWS OF REGULATORY REFORM—BRAZIL STRENGTHENING
GOVERNANCE FOR GROWTH (2008) (aiming to assist the Brazilian government in improv-
ing regulatory quality).
89 Id. at 315–16.
90 See Natalia Cardenas, Michel Temer—President of Brazil, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Michel-Temer [https://perma.cc/AV8F-4MUU] (last
updated Sept. 19, 2019) (President Dilma Roussef was impeached in 2016 by Congress
and the Vice President Michel Temer, from a more conservative party (called PMDB),
assumed executive branch responsibilities).
91 OECD, supra note 74.
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organization.92 As regulatory policy and cost-benefit analysis are the fore-
most agenda within the OECD, it is expected that once Brazil becomes
an official member of the OECD, efforts to effectively introduce cost-
benefit analysis into the bureaucratic routines of the Brazilian adminis-
trative state will likely be part of the reform agenda of regulatory policy
in Brazil.93
As the potential impacts of introducing cost-benefit analysis into
environmental law and policy in Brazil are substantial, Part II of this Ar-
ticle will present a big picture of that field in Brazil and discuss how
traditional cost-benefit analysis might negatively affect the development
of that legal and policy field.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN BRAZIL
This section explores the development of environmental law and
policy in Brazil to draw a big picture and point out some general features
of that field. By understanding the particularities of the Brazilian dy-
namic for creating laws and policies protecting the environment, it will be
possible to assess the risks posed by cost-benefit analysis to the develop-
ment of Brazil’s environmental law and policy.
A. Background and History
1. Before the Modern Environmental Law
An agrarian society and a nationalist government94 provided the
formula that created the first set of environmental laws in Brazil. Those
laws, however, did not primarily seek to protect the environment. By
rationalizing the use and exploitation of nature, President Vargas
(1930–1937) sought to create and develop national industries based on
92 On April 30, 2019, the new Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro proposed to Congress
a law requiring regulatory impact analysis before new regulations, in order to avoid being
overly burdensome on business. See Medida Provisória No. 881, de 30 de Abril de 2019,
DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 30.4.2019 (Braz.).
93 OECD, INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK FOR UNDERTAKING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
(RIA) 3–4 (2008).
94 Nationalist because the Vargas Administration based its economic policies on the crea-
tion of new manufacturing industries owned and managed by the Brazilian government
or by Brazilian citizens (not foreign investors, for example). See The Vargas era, ENCYCLO-
PEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Brazil/The-Vargas-era [https://perma
.cc/5FBH-YG9H] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
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natural resources being rationally managed.95 Big state companies, such
as Vale do Rio Doce (mining) and Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (a
steel mill), were created under President Vargas.96 It was also during his
administration that one of the early wells for oil and gas production was
drilled (in 1939 in the state of Bahia).97
Having industrialization as a major political goal, President Vargas
enacted several laws on the management and rational use of natural re-
sources. A Forest Code, a Mining Code, a Water Code, and a law for hunt-
ing and fishing were all enacted in 1934.98 Although some of those laws
represented advances in environmental protection, they were not de-
signed primarily to protect nature. Rather, their purpose was directed
toward economic development by regulating the rational use of natural
resources and avoiding their depletion.99
Avoiding foreign interference through exploitation of national
natural resources was another concern for President Vargas’s administra-
tion.100 Natural resources, such as those exploited through mining, the
water used as the base for an energy supply, and even the plants and
animals in strategic national territories, such as the Amazon Forest,
were all viewed as strategic national property.101
But, more than in any other period in Brazil’s history, the events
that occurred during the military government (especially the industrial
policies adopted after the oil crises of 1973 and 1979) shaped the major
features of the modern environmental law inaugurated during the period
of transition to democracy throughout the eighties in Brazil.102 Most of
95 Stanley E. Hilton, Vargas and Brazilian Economic Development, 1930–1945: A Re-
appraisal of his Attitude Toward Industrialization and Planning, 35 J. ECON. HIST. 754,
755 (1975).
96 VALE, VALE—OUR HISTORY 41 (2012), http://www.vale.com/EN/aboutvale/book-our-his
tory/Documents/livro/valehistorybook2.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4S3-L74A]; History 1941,
COMPANHIA SIDERÚRGICA NACIONAL, http://www.csn.com.br/conteudo_eni.asp?idioma=1&
conta=46&tipo=59573 [https://perma.cc/QME6-4EY5] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
97 Luciana Braga, Oil in Brazil Evolution of Exploration and Production, ENCYCLOPÉDIE-
DE L’ÉNERGIE (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.encyclopedie-energie.org/oil-in-brazil-evolution
-of-exploration-production/ [https://perma.cc/6X9J-66TR].
98 Jose Augusto Drummond & Ana Flavia Barros-Platíau, Brazilian Environmental Laws
and Policies, 1934–2002: A Critical Overview, LAW & POL’Y 83, 87–88 (2006).
99 See VALE, supra note 96, at 42–44.
100 Id. at 44.
101 Id. at 43, 45.
102 See Jose Augusto Padua, Environmentalism in Brazil: A Historical Perspective, in A
COMPANION TO GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 468 (J. R. McNeill & Erin Stewart
Mauldin eds., 2012).
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the first laws and regulations for environmental protection (particularly
the Constitutional provision of an environmental impact assessment)103
designed during the democratic transition were direct responses to envi-
ronmental concerns raised after the policies adopted in the 1970s.104
It was during the military government that vast infrastructure
projects with meaningful environmental impacts were created and im-
plemented. Some examples are: (a) the second largest hydroelectric power
plant in the world (called Itaipú);105 (b) the fifth largest hydropower plant
in the world, built in the Amazon Forest (called Tucuruí);106 (c) the initial
plan to build another large hydropower plant in the Amazon Forest (called
Belo Monte);107 (d) the longest bridge in the Southern Hemisphere, with
8.25 miles of length (called Ponte Rio—Niteroi);108 (e) a highway to link
Northeast Brazil and the Amazon (called Transamazônica);109 (f) an ambi-
tious project to develop mining and steel industries, called Projeto Carajás,
covering 222,394,843 acres of the Amazon Forest;110 and (g) the first two
nuclear plants in Rio de Janeiro.111
But, especially after the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, Brazil again
dealt with enormous difficulties regarding its balance of payments. To
103 See KATHRYNE HOCHSTETLER & MARGARET E. KECK, GREENING BRAZIL: ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTIVISM IN STATE AND SOCIETY 36 (2007); Caroline Fan Rocha et al., Manufacturing Pre-
Decisions: A Comparative Analysis of Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Reviews in
Brazil and Portugal, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 3235, 3240 (2019).
104 HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra note 103, at 63.
105 Saoirse Kerrigan, Top 21 Dams In the World That Generate the Highest Amount of Elec-




107 See Belo Monte Hydropower Project, NS ENERGY, https://www.nsenergybusiness.com
/projects/belo-monte-hydropower-project-brazil/ [https://perma.cc/7XKU-HD3A] (last visited
Dec. 3, 2019) (The project was finished only in 2015, after decades of critiques about
environmental and social problems related to native populations in the Amazon Forest.
Today, Belo Monte is the fourth largest hydropower plant in the world.).
108 The longest, tallest and oldest bridges in the world, TELEGRAPH, https://www.telegraph
.co.uk/news/picturegalleries/worldnews/8611082/The-longest-tallest-and-oldest-bridges
-in-the-world.html?image=8 [https://perma.cc/AUZ6-S9PJ] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
109 Kaushik Patowary, The Trans-Amazonian Highway: An Ecological Disaster, AMUSING
PLANET (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.amusingplanet.com/2014/11/the-trans-amazonian
-highway-ecological.html [https://perma.cc/P6V2-9V2M].
110 See Philip M. Fearnside, The Charcoal of Carajás: Pig-Iron Smelting Threatens the For-
ests of Brazil’s Eastern Amazon Region, 18 AMBIO 141, 141 (1989).
111 Nuclear Power in Brazil, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, https://www.world-nuclear.org/infor
mation-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/brazil.aspx [https://perma.cc/DX92-42M3]
(last updated Apr. 2019).
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remedy this situation, agriculture once more became a strategic sector to
be officially protected. Then, the military government planned the expan-
sion of not only agriculture, but also livestock, to raise the export rates.112
Exploring new frontiers toward the Amazon Forest became an official
goal.113 It was the seed of a lingering era of vast deforestation rates over
the eighties in the Amazon Forest and of the flourishing of a new envi-
ronmental law and policy agenda.
As the military regime sought unprecedented economic develop-
ment, there was strong pressure from the international community for
environmental protection in Brazil, particularly concerned with the pre-
servation of the Amazon Forest.114 This was at the time of the Stockholm
Conference on Environment (held in 1972), and the military regime was
particularly skeptical about environmental concerns.115
At the same time, conservationist groups in Brazil were able to
influence the enactment of several environmental laws to regulate the
use of natural resources such as forests, fishing, and mining.116 Even a
law on pollution control was adopted and the first environmental agency
in the federal government was established in 1976.117
Those conservationist efforts during the military regime’s bureau-
cracy were the main drivers of new strict laws such as the new Forest
Code of 1965118 and a law to protect wild animals in 1967.119 The Forest
112 HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra note 103, at 140–41.
113 Id.
114 Padua, supra note 102, at 467, 469.
115 An illustration of the particular difficulties for the development of the environmental
agenda under the military regime was a written statement made by the Brazilian
Secretary of Interior at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held
in Stockholm in 1972. See HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra note 103, at 112–13.
116 See Drummond & Barros-Platíau, supra note 98, at 89–95. Since the military regime did
not easily accept foreign pressure that could put at risk its plans for economic development,
internal organizations became essential to push the environmental agenda. With Congress
closed or immobilized by the military and no democratic rights of action for groups and citi-
zens, the official channels to dispute new environmental laws and policies could be only
found within the federal bureaucracy. For that purpose, personal networks were critical to
allow national conservationist groups to influence the military government’s environmental
agenda. See Dom Phillips & Nick Miroff, Brazil’s new government may be less likely to protect
the Amazon, critics say, WASH. POST (May 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/the_americas/brazils-new-government-may-be-less-likely-to-protect-the-amazon-critics-say
/2016/05/21/22cbce08-1c7d-11e6-82c2-a7dcb313287d_story.html [https://perma.cc/EHP9-82PF].
117 HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra note 103, at 26–27.
118 See Lei No. 4.771, de 15 de Setembro de 1965, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
16.9.1965 (Braz.).
119 See Lei No. 5.197, de 3 de Janeiro de 1967, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
5.1.1967 (Braz.).
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Code of 1965 provided, for example, that all owners of unexploited forests
should conserve at least 50 percent of their forested area.120 This rule
especially affected the large unexplored areas of the Amazon Forest.121
Further, several ecologically important areas, such as riparian forests,
were also specially protected by that Code.122 Even environmental educa-
tion programs for schools became mandatory under that Code.123 Many
of these provisions created the conceptual basis for later improvements
that survive up to now in laws dealing with forest protection.
Apart from environmental laws on forests, an environmental
agency (called SEMA) was created in 1973.124 With a limited structure,
that agency could do little to prevent harm to the environment caused by
all of the industry and infrastructure projects strongly supported by the
military regime. Despite its limitations, SEMA was very influential for
later designs of environmental laws and policies over the democratic
transition period. The national policy for environmental protection
promulgated in 1981, a landmark environmental law in Brazil (similar
to the National Environmental Policy Act in the United States), was
originally proposed by SEMA.125
The military regime represented the last term of successive poli-
cies on economic planning to promote the development of broad industrial
sectors in Brazil. Following the patterns for economic policy initiated by
President Vargas, the military regime initiated an unprecedented expan-
sion in economic sectors such as energy, steel, transportation, and chemi-
cals.126 But, contrary to the early policies on economic development, the
military regime reinserted agriculture and cattle raising as strategic
economic sectors to be officially supported and expanded, mainly through
financial subsidies and public land concessions in the Amazon Forest
region.127 This circumstance would be quite influential for the shape of
modern environmental law in Brazil.





124 LESLEY MCALLISTER, MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL 22 (2008).
125 See id. at 22–23.
126 See Jeffry A. Frieden, The Brazilian Borrowing Experience: From Miracle to Debacle
and Back, 22 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 95, 101–06 (1987).
127 HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra note 103, at 140, 145–46.
2020] THE POLITICS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 581
2. Democratic Transition: The Flourishing of Modern
Environmental Law
The particular model of economic development adopted by the
military regime was associated with environmental problems. Not sur-
prisingly, major infrastructure projects implemented by the military regime
triggered the first public demonstrations by socio-environmental organi-
zations in Brazil throughout the ’70s.128 The Campaign in Defense of the
Amazon (1978), the Campaign against the Use of Nuclear Energy (1980),
and a protest called “Goodbye, Seven Falls” (1985) were the most influen-
tial rallies led by environmentalist organizations during the military
regime.129 As conservationist groups had traditionally opted to influence
government by occupying internal posts in federal agencies, socio-envi-
ronmental groups preferred public campaigns and demonstrations.130
After intense popular pressure, the period of the 1980s and early
1990s marked the transition to democracy and the beginning of modern
environmental law and policy in Brazil.131 From the first national policy
for environmental protection in 1981 through the Constitution of 1988,
the influence of social movements was meaningful.132 Indeed, after years
of military dictatorship in Brazil, environmentalists were eager to partic-
ipate and influence new public policies to deal with all the transforma-
tions which the country had gone through under the military regime.
The environmental impacts of large infrastructure projects and
policies on exploitation of the Amazon Forest, both carried out by the
military, were still present in the environmentalists’ minds and influ-
enced their priorities for the political agenda over the ’80s.133 To deal
with the environmental impacts caused by infrastructure projects and
intensive land use for agriculture and cattle raising, laws and policies for
natural resource conservation became a political priority during the con-
stitutional debates.
128 See LISA THOMPSON & CHRIS TAPSCOTT, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: PER-
SPECTIVES FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH 142–43 (2014).
129 See id.
130 See HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra note 103, at 99–110.
131 EDUARDO BUENO, BRASIL: UMA HISTÓRIA 396 (2005) (More than one million people
took to the streets in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in 1984 in a movement called Diretas-
Já, putting pressure for general elections in Brazil. Further, the eighties marked the
decline of communist countries and the end of the Cold War, easing the pathway for
democracy in Brazil).
132 See Padua, supra note 102, at 465.
133 Id. at 466–68.
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a. The Environmentalist Agenda and the Constitution of 1988
Environmentalists were successful during the constitutional pro-
cess by lobbying for the inclusion of an unprecedented and exclusive
chapter for environmental protection in the Constitution of 1988. Among
other provisions, the constitutional text provided: (a) a fundamental right
to a balanced environment; (b) special legal status to some biomes such
as the Amazon Forest and the Atlantic Forest; (c) mandatory environmen-
tal impact assessments for all potentially harmful infrastructure pro-
jects; (d) protection to endangered species; (e) the prohibition of actions
of cruelty against animals; and (f) the imposition to federal lawmakers of
the duty to create a criminal code for environmental violations.134 Fur-
ther, the Constitution provides that all economic activities should take
into consideration environmental concerns.135
Importantly, the final result of the constitutional process in 1988
reaffirmed a common pattern for environmental law and policy in Brazil
since the earliest laws enacted over the ’30s: a preference for rule-making
on conservation of natural resources rather than pollution control.136
b. Environmental Regulation: Building Environmental Agencies
Environmental agencies are fundamental for the success of envi-
ronmental law and policy. Enforcing laws refers to the rule of law. With-
out an official structure to monitor and apply the law, every aspect of a
given legal field loses its credibility. This is especially important for
environmental law.
Instead of the American legal tradition on administrative law,
which assigns the regulatory power for industries almost exclusively to
agencies, Brazil has a different background for the legal framework deal-
ing with the relationship between government and industries. While the
United States has regulated industries since the creation of its early
regulatory agencies in the 19th century,137 regulation of private markets
in Brazil only became a widespread practice by agencies after the admin-
istrative reforms and their privatization programs introduced during the
134 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.).
135 Id. art. 170.
136 Roger W. Findley, Pollution Control in Brazil, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 6–7 (1988).
137 See A Brief History of Administrative Government, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, https://
www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3461 [https://perma.cc/A7FG-5JTC] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
2020] THE POLITICS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 583
nineties.138 In Brazil, environmental laws and regulations had mostly
been designed by Presidents since the earliest laws of the thirties.139
B. CONAMA—The New Environmental Regulator
Historically, laws and policies for environmental protection were
the result of successful lobbies from conservationist groups within the
governments.140 However, the presidential influence over the environ-
mental agenda also imposed meaningful limits on the development of
environmental law and policy in Brazil, particularly for national policies
on pollution control.141 In this context, the creation of the National Council
of the Environment (“CONAMA”) in 1981142 as a council integrated by
different social groups and responsible for rule-making on environmental
protection opened the real possibility of an institutional experiment
based on collaborative governance.
With CONAMA, Brazil diverged from its tradition of administra-
tive state institutions. Rather than an agency strictly subordinated to an
administration’s agenda, CONAMA could lead a deep transformation of
environmental law and policy in Brazil through a technical, participative,
transparent, and accountable new regulatory dynamic.
CONAMA’s outset was promising. The eighties were dominated by
environmental regulations promulgated by that council.143 Rules on nature
conservation, environmental impact assessment requirements and proce-
dures, air pollution, and chemicals were all the result of broad consensus
within CONAMA, and some of them have been the most consequential
138 Padua, supra note 102, at 469–70.
139 By 1984, the traditional authorities for environmental policymaking in Brazil had been
Congress and the president. See HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra note 103, at 34–35. Stat-
utes and executive orders were the most usual instruments to transform ideas into
practice for environmental protection. Laws on forest conservation, mining and water
regulation, among others, were enacted after internal political decisions which were made
under quite limited scrutiny. See generally Gonçalves et al., Environmental law and prac-




140 See generally HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra note 103.
141 See generally id.
142 See Lei No. 6.938, de 31 de Agosto de 1981, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
2.9.1981 (Braz.).
143 See HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra note 103, at 32–36.
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for environmental law and policy in Brazil.144 National policies on deser-
tification and air pollution were promulgated.145 Protected areas were
established as well.146 It is indicative of the environment of this new era
that, after CONAMA’s effective inauguration in 1984,147 only two laws
promulgated by Congress and signed by the President over the eighties
dealt with environmental issues.148
According to one of CONAMA’s founders, that agency was “in fact,
one of the rare environmental parliaments in the world,”149 meaning that
different social groups would have room to actively participate in new
environmental regulations.
However, subsequent developments discussed later in this Article
demonstrate that a traditional Brazilian-style presidential dominance
over agencies would fight to reassert its influence on environmental law
and policy.150 CONAMA’s authority as a primary source of environmental
law and policy in Brazil would be directly challenged.
1. Enforcing the Law
While CONAMA was responsible for rule-making on environmen-
tal protection, another new environmental agency was created in 1989
to enforce the law.151 That agency was called IBAMA and replaced previ-
ously separate structures throughout the federal government responsible
144 See Gonçalves et al., supra note 139 (Regulations enacted over the eighties on en-
vironmental impact assessments have been particularly influential in Brazil.).
145 See Resolução No. 238, de 22 de Dezembro de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]
de 23.12.1997 (Braz.).
146 See Resolução No. 18, de 7 de Dezembro de 1989, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
24.1.1990 (Braz.); Resolução No. 11, de 14 de Setembro de 1989, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 18.12.1989 (Braz.); Resolução No. 27, de 3 de Dezembro de 1986, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 22.1.1987 (Braz.); Resolução No. 17, de 18 de Dezembro de
1984, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 25.1.1985 (Braz.); Resolução No. 14, de 18 de
Dezembro de 1984, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.11.1984 (Braz.); Resolução
No. 11, de 26 de Setembro de 1984, BOLETIM DE SERVIÇO/MI de 1.11.1984 (Braz.).
147 HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra note 103, at 34–35.
148 “Those laws dealt with domestic liquid wastes, the prohibition of whale hunting, and
a national plan for managing the Brazilian coast.”RÔMULO SILVEIRA DA ROCHA SAMPAÍO,
DIREITO AMBIENTAL: DOUTRINA E CASOS PRÁTICOS 134 (2011).
149 CONSELHO NACIONAL DO MEIO AMBIENTE (BRASIL), MINISTÉRIO DO MEIO AMBIENTE,
RESOLUÇÕES DO CONAMA: RESOLUÇÕES VIGENTES PUBLICADAS ENTRE SETEMBERO DE 1984
E JANEIRO DE 2012, at 9 (2012).
150 See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
151 See Lei No. 7.735, de 22 de Fevereiro de 1989, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
23.2.1989 (Braz.).
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for natural resources protection.152 Although IBAMA’s functions covered
all national territory, special concerns about the Amazon Forest arose as
deforestation reached historically high levels at the end of the eighties
(“[b]y 1990, deforestation had destroyed about 10 to 15 percent of the
Brazilian Amazon”).153 Furthermore, IBAMA was responsible for moni-
toring and managing protected areas such as the national parks.154
Another important responsibility of IBAMA deals with issuing
permits for (a) industries after analyzing environmental impact assess-
ments (EIA) of infrastructure projects and (b) industries interested in the
production and selling of pesticides.155
The creation of IBAMA in 1989 provided Brazil with an unprece-
dented structure to enforce environmental law in the field.156 Historically
low levels of enforcement of environmental laws had definitively shifted
its historical course.157 The challenges were enormous for a developing
country with a huge territory and the largest tropical forest in the world
to oversee.
2. Subsequent Developments and Current Framework
a. Presidential Rule-Making Dominance: Regaining Control
Brazil has a long history of laws and regulations on environmental
protection promulgated by different administrations. Forest and mining
codes, water and animal laws, and laws regarding protected areas have
all been regulated mostly by presidents.158
152 Renata Garcia, Introduction to IBAMA, BRAZ. BUS., https://thebrazilbusiness.com/arti
cle/introduction-to-ibama [https://perma.cc/X5DE-ZTK2] (last updated June 16, 2015).
153 MARSHALL EAKIN, BRAZIL: THE ONCE AND FUTURE COUNTRY 94 (1998); HOCHSTETLER
& KECK, supra note 103, at 36.
154 Marina Silva, The Brazilian Protected Area Programs, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 608,
608 (2005). These functions were transferred to another environmental agency created
later. Lei No. 11.516, de 28 de Agosto de 2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
28.8.2007 (Braz.).
155 See Brazil has good procedures for estimating environmental impacts of enterprises, but
putting them in practice is difficult, RES. CTR. FOR GAS INNOVATION (May 2, 2017), https://
www.rcgi.poli.usp.br/brazil-has-good-procedures-for-estimating-environmental-impacts
-of-enterprises-but-putting-them-in-practice-is-difficult/ [https://perma.cc/35KR-XM5F];
Pesticides, AGENCIA NACIONAL DE VIGILANCIA SANITARIA, http://portal.anvisa.gov.br/en
/pesticides [https://perma.cc/5TEB-68PR] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
156 See Garcia, supra note 152.
157 See HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra note 103, at 24–26.
158 See Drummond & Barros-Platíau, supra note 98, at 86.
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Even after the creation of CONAMA in 1981, presidents have re-
mained highly influential on environmental law and policy. Apart from
directly promulgating laws and executive orders, different administra-
tions have nudged CONAMA’s regulations by controlling its agenda.
Thus, this section deals with the effects of that ongoing control of the
environmental law and policy agenda by presidential influence over reg-
ulatory matters.
As seen before, the creation of CONAMA as a powerful regulatory
board to produce general rules for industries and private citizens regard-
ing environmental protection was a deep institutional experiment for the
Brazilian administrative state tradition. Although several important
regulations have been enacted by CONAMA, its powers have been con-
tinuously challenged by traditional presidential dominance of the admin-
istrative state.159
Presidential control of CONAMA’s policymaking agenda might be
realized by the different patterns of regulatory production over time. By
law, for example, the president of CONAMA has been the Secretary of
Environment (a cabinet member), which means that this authority pre-
sides over all the council meetings and has large control over its political
agenda,160 triggering grievances among CONAMA’s members.161
This difficulty is explained by the Brazilian tradition of presiden-
tial dominance over the administrative state. At least since the promul-
gation of the current Brazilian constitution, the control of the political
agenda has been dominated by the president.162 Even after business-
friendly reforms during the ’90s that created independent regulatory
agencies, presidential dominance remained preserved.163 Economic regu-
lation of private activities in Brazil has been historically linked to laws
and regulations enacted by presidents, not decided by administrative
159 For information about presidential dominance over agencies in Brazil, see generally
Mariana Mota Prado, Presidential Dominance from a Comparative Perspective: The
Relationship Between the Executive Branch and Regulatory Agencies in Brazil, 3 BRAZ.
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 74 (2016).
160 See Social and environmental policy in IDB Annual Meeting, INTER-AM. DEV. BANK
(Mar. 12, 2002), https://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2002-03-12/social-and-envi
ronmental-policy-in-idb-annual-meeting,1681.html [https://perma.cc/2VWE-4FXS]. Also
by law, the Deputy Secretary of Environment is the main executive official to organize
CONAMA’s activities. Decreto No. 99.274, de 6 de Junho de 1990, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 7.6.1990 (Braz.).
161 HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra 103, at 42.
162 See generally Prado, supra note 159.
163 Id.
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agencies.164 Even during democratic periods over the 20th century, the
Brazilian administrative tradition limited agencies’ roles to the enforce-
ment of laws and regulations.165
On regulation of chemicals, the presidential dominance has been
particularly evident. Asbestos, a hazardous chemical partially banned in
the United States since 1973 by the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”), was regulated—not completely banned—by a federal law166 and
a resolution by CONAMA.167 It was only in 2009 that a law approved by
Congress and signed by the President prohibited the use of DDT.168 Fur-
ther, pesticides are regulated by a federal law169 and an executive order,170
not by CONAMA.
Subjects such as conserving nature, controlling pollution, and
regulating chemicals share a similar feature: they rest on a scientific
basis. If environmental agencies exist to provide technical decisions on
subjects where handling should not rely on political or random motiva-
tions, Presidents should not undermine agencies’ authority on a perma-
nent basis. Notwithstanding, in the case of Brazil, CONAMA’s authority
remains directly challenged by presidential influence.
b. Reinforcing a Preference for Natural Resource Conservation
The preference for natural resources rather than pollution control
laws has been a historical feature of environmental law and policy in
Brazil.171 Forest codes, laws on water management and protection, and
extensive protected areas have been central features of the policymaking
landscape on environmental protection. Even the Constitution of 1988’s
164 See id. at 80–81 (detailing the historical large grant of authority to the Brazilian
President by the country’s constitution).
165 See id. at 81–85 (explaining the Brazilian President’s control over the legislative branch).
166 See Lei No. 9.055, de 1 de Junho de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
2.6.1995 (Braz.).
167 See Resolução No. 7, de 16 de Setembro de 1987, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]
de 22.10.1987 (Braz.).
168 Lei No. 11.936, de 14 de Maio de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 15.5.2009
(Braz.).
169 See Lei No. 7.802, de 11 de Julho de 1989, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
12.7.1989 (Braz.).
170 See Decreto No. 4.074, de 4 de Janeiro de 2002, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
8.1.2002 (Braz.).
171 By conservation of natural resources, I mean rules that intend to protect pristine or
non-urban areas. Rules on urban pollution, for example, are not included in that concept.
Estela Neves, Institutions and Environmental Governance in Brazil: The Local Govern-
ments’ Perspective, 20 REVISTA DE ECONOMIA CONTEMPORÂNEA 492, 495–97 (2016).
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provisions on environmental protection were based on natural resource
conservation.172 This regulatory landscape has not essentially changed
since then. Several laws promulgated by Congress and the President, more
than a hundred regulations enacted by CONAMA, the daily law enforce-
ment by IBAMA, legal academic debates, federal court decisions (some
of the most innovative legal principles on environmental law developed
in Brazil have been linked to conservation purposes),173 and most of the
real world of environmental law and policy in Brazil have dealt with rules
on nature conservation.174
Forest protection, in particular, has been the most traditional field
of environmental law and policy in Brazil. Due to this tradition, new legal
strategies on forest management and protection have been developed
beyond those provided by the Forest Code. Besides the Forest Code, the
Atlantic Forest Act, and Protected Areas Act, a new law promulgated in
2006175 (later detailed by the President through an executive order)176 has
created a leasing program for forests on government lands.177 As the
federal and state governments have had difficulty in monitoring vast
portions of the forests in the Amazon, that law was intended to avert
clandestine logging and mining (common practices in the Amazon Forest)
by improving the rational occupation and use of natural resources in
forests by industries.178
Further, a fairly strict Criminal and Administrative Code on
Environmental Infractions was promulgated in 1998 and regulated by
presidential executive orders in 1999 and 2008.179 Mostly concerned with
172 See Brazil Complete New Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 1988), https://www.ny times
.com/1988/09/03/world/brazil-complete-new-constitution.html [https://perma.cc/UQN2-RP7V].
173 The legal doctrine of in dubio pro nature established by the Brazilian High Court (Su-
perior Tribunal de Justiça) and the “prohibition against regression” principle developed
by scholars are both linked to conservation purposes. See generally PAULO DE BESSA
ANTUNES, DIREITO AMBIENTAL (15th ed. 2013).
174 See Gonçalves et al., supra note 139.
175 See Lei No. 11.284, de 2 de Março de 2006, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
3.3.2006 (Braz.).
176 See Decreto No. 6.063, de 20 de Março de 2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
21.3.2007 (Braz.).
177 Since then, private companies might have a concession for a defined term to explore
forests under strict sustainable requirements. Lei No. 11.284, de 2 de Março de 2006,
DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 3.3.2006 (Braz.).
178 See Lei No. 11.284, de 2 de Março de 2006, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
3.3.2006 (Braz.); Scott Wallace, Inside the faltering fight against illegal Amazon logging,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/20
19/08/brazil-logging/ [https://perma.cc/YHM9-UQ6V].
179 See Decreto No. 6.514, de 22 de Julho de 2008, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
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conserving natural resources, five different groups of crimes were listed
according to the following classification: (a) crimes against animals; (b)
crimes against plants; (c) crimes against environmental authorities; (d)
crimes committed by polluters; and (e) crimes against protected monu-
ments.180 An empowered Ministério Público (the official prosecutor in
Brazil) has been particularly important for enforcing this law.181
Instead of the broad sets of laws and regulations in the United
States on air and water pollution, environmental concerns more connected
to urban issues have been only a marginal portion of environmental law
and policy at the federal level in Brazil. Though CONAMA has enacted
some important regulations setting forth water quality standards and
limits on industrial and vehicular air pollution, there have been no clear
goals nor effective implementation and monitoring plans to guide local
or state governments.182
Air and water pollution remains primarily a local or state issue
for environmental law and policy. This trend has led a highly influential
scholar in Brazil to advocate for a separate legal field called urban law,
dealing mostly with local or state regulations on environmental problems
(such as water and air pollution) triggered mostly by housing, sanitation,
and transportation issues.183
But the point to be reinforced here is that pollution control, though
legally more connected to local and state governments, continues to re-
quire a national strategy. National standards fixed and updated on a
regular basis, clear national goals and deadlines, production of scientific
data on a national scale, and implementation plans should all be part of
a national strategy for dealing with pollution control.
23.7.2008 (Braz.); Lei No. 9.605 de 12 de Fevereiro de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 13.2.1998 (Braz.).
180 See Lei No. 9.605, de 12 de Fevereiro de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
13.2.1998 (Braz.).
181 See generally MCALLISTER, supra note 124; Brazilian Ministerio Publico’s Environmental
Actions, ENVTL. RTS. DATABASE, http://environmentalrightsdatabase.org/brazilian-min
isterio-publicos-environmental-actions/ [https://perma.cc/TF85-CLEU] (last visited Dec. 3,
2019).
182 See DAVID G. VICTOR ET AL., LAB. ON INT’L LAW & REGULATION, WATER MANAGEMENT
POLICY IN BRAZIL 7–17 (Mar. 2015); Bruno Felin, Air quality in Brazil: what’s at stake with
the change in standards, WRI BRAZ. (June 21, 2018), https://wribrasil.org.br/en/blog/2018
/06/air-quality-in-brazil [https://perma.cc/P5RC-765F]. But see Meghie Rodrigues, Brazil
launches air-quality-monitoring program, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (June 20,
2019), https://cen.acs.org/environment/pollution/Brazil-launches-air-quality-monitoring
/97/i25 [https://perma.cc/M2VA-HXTX].
183 See generally JOSÉ AFONSO DA SILVA, DIREITO URBANÍSTICO BRASILEIRO (2012).
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C. Potential Impacts from Cost-Benefit Analysis
As cost-benefit analysis advocated by the OECD entails a whole-
of-government approach, which means applying cost-benefit analysis to
all environmental laws and regulations to be imposed on industries, the
potential impacts of that economic tool for the development of environ-
mental law and policy in Brazil are addressed in this subpart.
1. On Natural Resources
Considering that Brazil has in its territory the largest rainforest
in the world (the Amazon Forest), a huge savanna (Cerrado), and the
Atlantic Forest with its high biodiversity, regulatory strategies on forest
protection have been a major concern for environmental law and policy
in this country.184 Not surprisingly, the Forest Code, the Atlantic Forest
Act, and the Protected Areas Act have been three of the most debated
environmental laws in Brazil.185 As cost-benefit analysis advocated by the
OECD entails a whole-of-government approach, it means that all policies
and regulations (new and existing) provided by those laws would be
subject to that economic test.
The Forest Code, for instance, assigns express preservation duties
to non-urban landowners in areas located within forests.186 A property
located in the Amazon Forest, for example, must have at least 80 percent
of its total size preserved.187 In other words, if a firm or a citizen has a
farm property located in the Amazon Forest, only 20 percent of its real
estate can be exploited.
As a law created to prevent the extinction of a global biodiversity
hotspot, the Atlantic Forest Act is a fairly detailed law that seeks to
184 See Brazil ‘invites deforestation’ with overhaul of environmental laws, GUARDIAN (Mar. 1,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/01/brazil-amazon-protection-laws-in
vite-deforestation-ngo [https://perma.cc/9FFU-BMKV]; What is Happening?, WORLD WILD-
LIFE FUND, https://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/brazil_forest_code_law.cfm [https://perma.cc
/CAN5-Z5YJ] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
185 See Untangling Brazil’s Controversial New Forest Code, WOODS HOLE RES. CTR. (Apr. 24,
2014), https://whrc.org/untangling-brazils-controversial-new-forest-code/ [https://perma.cc
/SSH2-FV2C] (The last reform of the Forest Code, for example, witnessed a large battle
among different groups but particularly between industries based on agriculture and
livestock, on one side, and environmentalist organizations, on the other.).
186 See Lei No. 12.651, de 25 de Maio de 2012, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
26.5.2012 (Braz.).
187 See id.; FREDERICO MACHADO & KATE ANDERSON, BRAZIL’S NEW FOREST CODE: A GUIDE
FOR DECISION-MAKERS IN SUPPLY CHAINS AND GOVERNMENTS 18, 43 (Marcel Viergever
trans., 1st ed. 2016).
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regulate almost every economic use of that forest and its resources.188 For
example, portions of areas located in the Atlantic Forest are classified by
CONAMA as original or restored vegetation according to their previous
use.189 The original vegetation in the Atlantic Forest cannot be suppressed,
except in quite strict situations.190
According to the whole-of-government approach advocated by the
OECD, meaningful provisions of the Forest Code, the Atlantic Forest Act,
and the Protected Areas Plan would enter into the scope of cost-benefit
analysis. Putting a price value on forests, such as the Amazon Forest and
the Atlantic Forest, would be the ultimate goal for cost-benefit analysis.
When dealing with benefits provided by the Amazon Forest or the
Atlantic Forest, traditional cost-benefit analysis would entail obscure
and highly speculative calculations for monetary quantification of plants
and animals (many of them still unknown), human lives, and ecosystems.
For a pristine region such as the Amazon Forest, the lungs of the world,
those calculations become even more complex, if not impossible.
It is intriguing to consider how the “willingness to pay” method
traditionally used by cost-benefit analysis could give monetary values for
all the benefits provided by the Amazon Forest. Indigenous populations
who live there have extraordinary knowledge about the value of all plants
and animals located in the Amazon Forest, but they have no idea about
their prices. Nevertheless, it is very likely that this accidental circum-
stance would not trigger any limitation for traditional cost-benefit analy-
sis since its “scientific findings” on prices for “products” supplied by the
Amazon Forest could be reached through surveys with people working in
refrigerated offices on the Avenida Paulista or playing soccer on Copaca-
bana Beach.
2. On Pollution Control
As several regulatory gaps can be noticed in the federal govern-
ment for dealing with pollution control, traditional cost-benefit analysis
188 See Lei No. 11.428, de 22 de Dezembro de 2006, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
26.12.2006 (Braz.).
189 Primary vegetation means a portion of forest never exploited before by human action.
In turn, restored vegetation means those areas exploited in the past but under a process
of restoration. For restored areas, the Atlantic Forest Act sets out two different degrees of
restoration: medium and advanced. Vegetation under advanced degree of restoration is better
protected by the Atlantic Forest Act than those classified as medium degree. See Lei No.
12.651, de 25 de Maio de 2012, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 26.5.2012 (Braz.).
190 For portions of the Atlantic Forest surrounding traditional protected areas such as
national parks, no human intervention is allowed by the Atlantic Forest Act. See id.
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might constitute an important barrier to overcoming those deficiencies.
In this sense, this section analyzes the potential impacts that cost-benefit
analysis might trigger for the future environmental policymaking agenda
for controlling pollution.
Currently, neither CONAMA nor the President use any specific eco-
nomic tool for decision-making processes on environmental laws and regu-
lations.191 Indeed, under the current decision-making process at CONAMA,
it is common that environmentalist organizations in that council play a
role in ratifying previous policy decisions taken by federal authorities.192
A new language from economics—familiar to the business commu-
nity but obscure to all other interested parties—would dominate the
debates at CONAMA and IBAMA as the new “rationale” for regulatory
policy on environmental protection. Economic terms such as “discount
rate,” “contingent valuation,” or “statistical life” would replace ordinary
language as the major source for solving complex challenges on protect-
ing the environment.
Still, as most of the decision-making processes at IBAMA deal with
licensing infrastructure projects,193 an obscure set of calculations would
be required for each agency’s step in those proceedings. So, in order to
decide whether to give a permit for a polluting plant, the traditional cost-
benefit analysis would consider the economic gains from an infrastructure
project as the benefits side. The cost side would consist first of the price
of equipment, machines, and workforce, among other ordinary transac-
tion costs related to the construction and operation of the business,194 but
191 See Natalie Unterstell, Brazil Doesn’t Have to Choose Between the Environment and
the Economy, AMS. Q. (June 6, 2019), https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/brazil
-doesnt-have-choose [https://perma.cc/7R7W-K6UR]; Regulation of Air Pollution: Brazil,
LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/air-pollution/brazil.php [https://perma.cc
/G4KF-9F6X] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
192 HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra note 103, at 42–43.
193 See Garcia, supra note 152. IBAMA issues other important licenses such as those for
producing or importing pesticides and for exporting species labeled as endangered under
the CITES Convention. EDITH BROWN WEISS & HAROLD K. JACOBSEN, ENGAGING COUN-
TRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 491
(1998); Jenny Gonzales, Brazil’s fundamental pesticide law under attack, MONGABAY
(Feb. 20, 2018), https://news.mongabay.com/2018/02/brazils-fundamental-pesticide-law
-under-attack/ [https://perma.cc/T2AT-4DGD].
194 But when IBAMA imposes a precaution measure, cost-benefit analysis would place the
infrastructure project as costs and the benefits would come from the precaution measures
adopted. See, e.g., Apartim Guatam et al., Brazil’s Belo Monte: A Cost Benefit Analysis,
ENERGY & ENERGY POL’Y, http://franke.uchicago.edu/bigproblems/BPRO29000-2014/Team
09-EnergyPolicyPaperBeloMonte.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KKH-MBKL].
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the main source of costs—environmental harms—would remain unquan-
tifiable.
D. Reducing Transparency and Accountability
Cost-benefit analysis entails the creation of an oversight authority
to supervise agencies’ proposed regulations. In the United States, the
oversight office for reviewing cost-benefit analysis from agencies is OIRA
and it is located in the central government (the White House’s official
structure).195
As OIRA has increased its influence on agencies’ decision-making
processes, the notice-and-comment process in the United States has been
challenged as the major institutional channel for organized groups to
influence final rules within agencies.196 Some actual justification for reg-
ulatory decisions might be tracked through informal talks between OIRA
and agencies rather than notice-and-comment proceedings held by
agencies.197 Furthermore, besides the comment period before agencies,
affected industries and their powerful lobbying structures have gained
other official instances for influencing regulatory decisions.198 Ultimately,
agencies’ notice-and-comment processes have been directly challenged as
the foremost opportunity for interested groups to discuss and to influence
agencies’ final decisions.
Following that pattern, the OECD has advocated for the creation
of oversight offices to supervise regulations proposed by agencies in its
member countries. The OECD suggests that those oversight offices would
be better located within central government instances such as the office
of the president or prime minister.199 Furthermore, as in the United States,
the OECD recommends that the main purpose for oversight offices should
be related to economic assessment through cost-benefit analysis of the
proposed regulations.200
195 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 42.
196 Farber & O’Connell, supra note 37, at 1138.
197 Heinzerling, supra note 36, at 328–29.
198 Id. at 343.
199 See generally OECD, supra note 4 (A majority of countries (twenty-six out of thirty-
five) have at least one oversight body located at the center of government (e.g., the prime
minister’s office or cabinet office). In addition, many countries have at least one body
based in the Ministry of Economy, Finance or Business (thirteen countries) which reflects
a focus on monitoring and reducing administrative burdens.).
200 According to OECD, another major mission for oversight offices is related to avoiding
conflicting rules among different agencies and departments, or even to assess their
594 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 44:559
In Brazil, creating an oversight office to supervise the decision-
making process at CONAMA will not be helpful to improve CONAMA’s
current transparency and accountability patterns. On the contrary, the
American experience has demonstrated that an oversight office is more
inclined to create unaccountable institutional channels that undermine
transparency and accountability expected from notice-and-comment pro-
cesses, particularly for environmental regulation.201
But those new informal channels would not be restricted to the
oversight office. Several governmental structures traditionally more con-
nected to powerful industries would become major players in the decision-
making process for environmental regulations. As the oversight office
would consult other departments about proposed rules by CONAMA,
those departments would probably use the oversight office to put a halt
to rules. The Brazilian Department of Agriculture and the Department
of Mining and Energy,202 for example, would likely become decisively in-
fluential on CONAMA’s regulations by pressing not that agency, but the
oversight office against new rules affecting their regulated industries.
Another problem from the introduction of a strict tool for economic
analysis is that it would create even more difficulty for environmental
organizations in Brazil. With already limited resources for tackling the
enormous environmental challenges in a large country such as Brazil,
environmental organizations would need to split their limited quantity
of energy and resources to hire an army of economists just to have a dia-
logue with the business community on monetary terms. All of this en-
deavor would only be to translate cost-benefit language for the general
public and to dispute arguments with the business organizations before
CONAMA and the oversight office.
appropriation with international treaties ratified by the country. See generally OECD,
supra note 75.
201 See Heinzerling, supra note 36, at 329 (“[T]he cost-benefit lens through which OIRA
viewed agency rules proved to skew against some kinds of rules, in particular environ-
mental rules, since so many of the benefits of environmental rules are difficult or impossible
to quantify and monetize, and since so many of these benefits occur in the future while
the settled practice of cost-benefit analysis is to steeply discount future consequences.”).
202 See, e.g., Brazil’s Farming Lobby Wields Its Growing Power, STRATFOR (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/brazils-farming-lobby-wields-its-growing-power
[https://perma.cc/PL9V-ES23]; Joe Sandler Clarke, International trade minister lobbied
Brazilian government on behalf of BP and Shell, UNEARTHED (Nov. 19, 2017), https://un
earthed.greenpeace.org/2017/11/19/brazil-shell-bp-greg-hands-liam-fox/ [https://perma.cc
/U9CC-CFNE] (Both departments have been fairly influenced by lobbies from their linked
industries such as agriculture, livestock, mining, and energy. These departments frequently
advocate openly for business interests within other government instances.).
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CONCLUSION
The conventional definition of regulation is government activity
that is intended to affect directly the behaviors of private sector agents
in order to align them with the “public interest.”203 Regulatory policies,
therefore, deal with political choices or preferences as to the extension of
how, where, and when governments might interfere in the economy to
accomplish a public interest agenda.
Reforms of regulatory policy based on laissez-faire ideas have
been “sold” by the OECD to countries such as Brazil as rational because
they would be politically neutral. But the crude reality is that those ideas
have origins in conservative groups and administrations in the United
States, which advocate deregulatory agendas on markets. Intriguingly,
regulatory policies born from progressive periods in the United States
(such as the New Deal and its notice-and-comment period or the ’70s and
their revolutions in environmental regulation) have not been able to
exert similar influence on OECD.
It is as if in the United States there were only free-market institu-
tions and mechanisms for regulatory policies on environmental, consumer,
or health protection issues. The truth, however, is that the laissez-faire
agenda against regulations often has been more envisioned by the con-
servative groups than practiced by administrations and agencies. For
environmental law and policy in the United States, for instance, there is
an incredible history of the development of laws and regulations204 whose
progressive ideas behind them are just ignored by those laissez-faire
“sellers” throughout the world.
As Brazil and the OECD become more closely associated on regu-
latory policy, the debates on the introduction of cost-benefit analysis in
Brazil cannot just be separated from that background. Cost-benefit analysis
has been a major political instrument for implementing a broader laissez-
faire agenda which reflects highly unsympathetic views of the weight of
governments in society. Simply using different names such as “Regula-
tory Impact Analysis” or soft adjectives for those radical reforms such as
“regulatory quality,” “smart regulation,” or “better regulation,” does not
change the essence of those laissez-faire ideas. Thus, before introducing
such reactionary policies and mechanisms into environmental law and
203 See generally Ha-Joon Chang, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 21 CAM-
BRIDGE J. ECON. 703 (1997).
204 See generally RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004).
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policy in Brazil, citizens, government officials, and public interest groups
should at least be aware of the politics of cost-benefit analysis and the
risks that it represents to that field.
For any reform of regulatory policy of environmental law and
policy in Brazil, one condition should be present: economic consideration
should be part of a broad institutional arrangement which includes sev-
eral regulatory tools and proceedings dealing with accountability, trans-
parency, participation, collaborative governance, political independence,
and improved research in science. The combination of institutional ele-
ments from CONAMA’s plural composition and democratic dynamic and
the American notice-and-comment rule-making process might be a useful
clue for an improved model of the decision-making process on environ-
mental law and policy in Brazil.
